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- Dancing with the Devil (The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes) - 9781594037238
Dancing with the Devil (The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes) - 9781594037238
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Product Details
Author:
Michael Rubin
Format:
Hardcover
Pages:
384
Publisher:
Encounter Books (February 18, 2014)
Language:
English
ISBN-13:
9781594037238
ISBN-10:
159403723X
Weight:
27.2oz
Dimensions:
6" x 9"
Case Pack:
16
File:
TWO RIVERS-PERSEUS-Metadata_Only_Perseus_Distribution_Customer_Group_Metadata_20250917125307-20250918.xml
Folder:
TWO RIVERS
As low as:
$24.07
List Price:
$27.99
Publisher Identifier:
P-PER
Discount Code:
C
Audience:
General/trade
Pub Discount:
60
Imprint:
Encounter Books
Overview
The world has seldom been as dangerous as it is now. Rogue regimesgovernments and groups that eschew diplomatic normality, sponsor terrorism, and proliferate nuclear weaponsthreaten the United States around the globe. Because sanctions and military action are so costly, the American strategy of first resort is dialogue, on the theory that it never hurts to talk to enemies.” Seldom is conventional wisdom so wrong.
Engagement with rogue regimes is not cost-free, as Michael Rubin demonstrates by tracing the history of American diplomacy with North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Further challenges to traditional diplomacy have come from terrorist groups, such as the PLO in the 1970s and 1980s, or Hamas and Hezbollah in the last two decades. The argument in favor of negotiation with terrorists is suffused with moral equivalence, the idea that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Rarely does the actual record of talking to terrorists come under serious examination.
While soldiers spend weeks developing lessons learned after every exercise, diplomats generally do not reflect on why their strategy toward rogues has failed, or consider whether their basic assumptions have been faulty. Rubin’s analysis finds that rogue regimes all have one thing in common: they pretend to be aggrieved in order to put Western diplomats on the defensive. Whether in Pyongyang, Tehran, or Islamabad, rogue leaders understand that the West rewards bluster with incentives and that the U.S. State Department too often values process more than results.
Engagement with rogue regimes is not cost-free, as Michael Rubin demonstrates by tracing the history of American diplomacy with North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Further challenges to traditional diplomacy have come from terrorist groups, such as the PLO in the 1970s and 1980s, or Hamas and Hezbollah in the last two decades. The argument in favor of negotiation with terrorists is suffused with moral equivalence, the idea that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Rarely does the actual record of talking to terrorists come under serious examination.
While soldiers spend weeks developing lessons learned after every exercise, diplomats generally do not reflect on why their strategy toward rogues has failed, or consider whether their basic assumptions have been faulty. Rubin’s analysis finds that rogue regimes all have one thing in common: they pretend to be aggrieved in order to put Western diplomats on the defensive. Whether in Pyongyang, Tehran, or Islamabad, rogue leaders understand that the West rewards bluster with incentives and that the U.S. State Department too often values process more than results.








